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Raymond Yamamoto, 
Assistant Professor at 
Aarhus University in 
Denmark, explains that 
“The fear of China gaining 
unrestricted control over 
other countries through 
BRI is unfounded when 
looking at Japan’s 
provisions of 
infrastructure through its 
Official Development 
Assistance (ODA) since 
1954. ” 
China’s Belt and Road Ini a ve (BRI) proposed by President Xi Jinping in 2013 is among the most 
ambi ous global visions promoted by one country. The general goal of BRI is the provision of economic 
infrastructure worth at least $1 trillion to improve the land and sea routes between Asia, Africa, and 
Europe. In order to a ract addi onal interna onal investments to finance the ini a ve, China even 
created a mul lateral bank – the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) — in 2015. However, 
China’s ambi ous BRI strategy has met considerable cri cism from poli cians and policy‐makers, 
journalists, analysts, and scholars. These cri cisms include accusa ons of pursuing debt‐trap diplomacy 
to gain concessions from countries par cipa ng in BRI. The decision of Sri Lanka in 2018 to lease 
Hambantota port to China in order to reduce its BRI debt burden is o en cited as a prime example. 
Together with growing Chinese military strength and asser veness in the South and East China Seas, 
BRI is being framed as an instrument deployed by China to build up its global dominance. 
However, at least in the case of Asia, the fear of China gaining unrestricted control over other 
countries through BRI is unfounded when looking at Japan’s provisions of infrastructure through its 
Official Development Assistance (ODA) since 1954. China´s BRI does not differ much from Japan’s ODA. 
Moreover, in a manner similar to China, Japan was harshly cri cized by the interna onal community 
for its ODA approach, which substan ally differed from those of other OECD countries. The targets of 
cri cisms were three dis nct characteris cs of ODA that could be found in China´s BRI as well: the 
assistance provided was mainly financed through loans that required repayment; the loans were ed 
to Japanese goods and services; and domes c socioeconomic and poli cal condi ons in recipient 
countries were neglected. 
Ini ally, Japan did not dedicate much a en on to the economic and social impacts of its ODA. Its 
approach considered only its own economic benefit. Disregarding the recipients’ circumstances, 
Japan´s ODA contributed to corrup on, debt and controversial expropria ons for large‐scale 
infrastructure projects. The economic penetra on of Japan in Southeast Asia triggered large an ‐
Japanese riots. The percep on of Japan as an economic imperialist ruthlessly exploi ng the region 
sparked violent protests across Southeast Asia in 1974. The strong an ‐Japanese sen ments quickly 
led the country to adopt the Fukuda Doctrine, promising heart‐to‐heart partnerships based on mutual 
trust. Following the doctrine, Japan began acknowledging the par cular needs of recipient countries, 
while ini a ng the process of untying ODA from its own goods and services.  
Japan was compelled to include the recipients’ interests in its policies in order to avoid growing 
mistrust and cri cism against its ODA, which was perceived as being mo vated by selfish na onal 
Overestimating the Power of China´s BRI – Lessons 
Drawn from Japanese ODA Engagement in Asia  
By Raymond Yamamoto 
APB Series Founding Editor: Dr. Satu Limaye | APB Series Coordinator: Peter Valente 
The views expressed in this publication are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the policy or position of the East-West Center or any organization 
with which the author is affiliated. 
The East-West Center promotes better relations and understanding among the people and nations of the United States, Asia, and the Pacific through 
cooperative study, research, and dialogue. Established by the US Congress in 1960, the Center serves as a resource for information and analysis on critical 
issues of common concern, bringing people together to exchange views, build expertise, and develop policy options. 
interests rather than philanthropic or public good sen ments. Japan´s economy was largely 
dependent on the success of ODA, which fulfilled several important tasks. ODA secured natural 
resources Japan was lacking, simultaneously crea ng produc on sites in countries with cheaper 
labor and strengthening economies, which then increased the purchasing power, demand and 
market for Japan‐made goods. One has to bear in mind that China’s BRI strategies primarily advance 
the country’s own economic development, which plays an important role in the Communist Party´s 
poli cal legi miza on. With the era of Chinese high economic growth ending, the enormous 
domes c demand in the construc on and machinery sectors is decreasing. BRI may help China in 
this economic transi on, crea ng opportuni es to export the overcapacity in those sectors to other 
countries. The infrastructure promoted by BRI also sets the groundwork for expor ng some of the 
manufacturing sites due to growing labor costs in China. Moreover, being a country that relies 
heavily on exports, there is a great economic incen ve to increase purchasing power in other 
countries, even more against the backdrop of the intensifying trade fric on with the United States 
which has led to tariffs on Chinese products exported to the United States. 
Due to the centrality of BRI for its economy, China cannot afford to ignore the increasing number of 
problems and cri cisms related to its implementa on. For example, the Myitsone dam project in 
Myanmar that China has been pushing is on hold because of environmental and social concerns. 
Malaysia’s Prime Minister Mahathir canceled a railway and two gas pipeline projects over concerns 
about the terms. Even Pakistan, formally a devoted BRI partner and close poli cal and security 
partner of China is currently reviewing its coopera on with Beijing. Like Japan in the 1970s, China is 
in the process of making several concessions indica ng its willingness to take more responsibility for 
the economic, social and environmental impacts of its assistance, thus answering to the external 
pressures demanding that the country address the recipients’ interests. In the past, many countries 
in Asia did not have alterna ves other than solu ons offered by China to sa sfy a great demand for 
infrastructural development. In the early 2010s, China was a pioneer in offering quick, affordable 
and un‐bureaucra c infrastructure. However, the circumstances are changing. Many countries and 
mul lateral organiza ons are now responding to the demands for infrastructure, providing a 
growing number of compe ng alterna ves to China’s BRI. In this new compe ve environment, 
China is being pushed to be more responsive to concerns of BRI recipient countries. 
Without a doubt, BRI is a massive project with a global impact. For a new player in the field of 
development assistance, project failures — such as cost miscalcula on because of poorly conducted 
feasibility studies — could be considered a ma er of course. However, the margin to u lize BRI as a 
coercion tool is rather small, as China´s economy depends on its posi ve recep on and success. 
Thus, the argument that China is using assistance deliberately causing large debts to aggressively 
increase its influence in Asia is ques onable, as it would cause irreparable damage to the reputa on 
of BRI. The history of Japan´s ODA teaches that China will con nuously adapt its BRI prac ces to 
meet the needs of its partners; ul mately with the aim of helping itself. 
"Due to the centrality of 
BRI for its economy, 
China cannot afford to 
ignore the increasing 
number of problems and 
cri cisms related to its 
implementa on." 
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